The IMF’s modest upgrade to global growth conceals a more troubling change in the foundations of the expansion. Output is now expected to rise 3.1% in 2026, slightly above July’s forecast, but below last year’s 3.5%. Meanwhile, inflation is proving more persistent and the resources available to absorb further shocks are diminishing.

The unchanged 3.4% growth forecast for 2027 therefore offers limited reassurance. The economy is performing better than expected partly because extraordinary technology spending and the use of emergency buffers are sustaining activity through an unusually prolonged energy disruption.

An investment boom can create financial dependencies far beyond the companies building it. Overseas savings help support American technology investment, chip suppliers earn revenue from that expansion, and local governments use data-centre taxes to finance public services.

Each participant may have a reasonable commercial or fiscal rationale. The vulnerability emerges when many of those decisions depend on the same assumption: that demand for computing will keep growing fast enough to justify the infrastructure, valuations and financial commitments being established today.

China’s explanation of the hybrid-car agreement shows how Beijing and Brussels can present the same restriction as a political achievement. The EU wants to slow a rapid increase in imports that is putting pressure on European manufacturers. China wants to preserve access to an important market while avoiding a broader confrontation.

By describing the arrangement as permitting growth from 2025 levels, Beijing is defending continued expansion, even as Brussels presents it as a substantial reduction in the shipments that might otherwise arrive.

European carmakers are turning familiar models into a way of making electric vehicles feel less unfamiliar. Reviving names such as the Renault 5 and Citroën 2CV allows manufacturers to connect new technology with memories of family cars, first journeys and everyday independence.

As Chinese competitors challenge them on price and technology, that emotional connection offers another reason for customers to choose a European brand. Its commercial value will depend on whether the revived cars deliver the affordability and usefulness that made their predecessors successful.

The recovery in Middle Eastern crude exports could shift a larger share of the oil industry’s earnings toward Asian refiners. Gulf producers are regaining access to customers, but damage to their processing facilities means they cannot convert as much of their own crude into higher-value fuels.

Asian plants with available capacity, suitable equipment and access to export markets could fill part of that gap. Their opportunity depends on the difference between recovering crude availability and the much slower restoration of diesel, gasoline and jet-fuel supplies.

Qatar’s LNG disruption shows why the recovery of Middle Eastern oil exports offers only limited reassurance to gas importers. More crude passing through Hormuz demonstrates that some producers and shipowners are willing to accept the risks of transit.

It does not establish the dependable shipping conditions needed to restore Qatar’s integrated gas industry. Production, processing, liquefaction and vessel schedules must function together. Until that chain becomes reliable, Qatar’s extensive reserves and installed export capacity will translate into far less supply than global buyers had expected.

Emerging Asia’s retreat from some LNG power projects challenges a central assumption behind the global gas industry’s expansion: that rapidly growing economies would increasingly replace coal with imported gas. Electricity demand continues to rise, but governments and utilities are reassessing whether LNG offers an affordable and dependable way to meet it.

Repeated supply shocks, expensive fuel and delays in obtaining equipment have weakened the case for projects that once appeared commercially attractive. Renewables are gaining opportunities as a result, although coal could also benefit wherever governments prioritise immediately available generation.

Europe’s gas crisis is developing into a prolonged problem of replenishing reserves, with consequences that could outlast the disruption to Middle Eastern supplies. Even if the Iran war ends and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz recovers, Europe would still need to replace the gas consumed during the coming winter.

That additional purchasing requirement could support prices well into 2027. A diplomatic breakthrough would remove an important source of uncertainty, but restoring comfortable inventories would require sustained deliveries, favourable weather and enough supply to meet competing demand elsewhere.