China’s expected record imports of US ethane show how the Iran war is reshaping Asia’s petrochemical feedstock map, not just its crude and LNG flows. April imports are projected to reach about 800,000 tons, roughly 60% above the usual monthly level, as Chinese producers try to replace disrupted naphtha and LPG supplies from the Middle East. Ethane has become especially attractive because it is both more available and far more profitable than crude-linked alternatives in the current market.

The background is that China’s petrochemical system remains heavily exposed to the Gulf. In February, more than half of its naphtha imports and over 40% of its LPG imports came from Persian Gulf suppliers, so the closure of Hormuz hit one of the most feedstock-dependent parts of Chinese industry almost immediately.

China’s March rare-earth magnet export data point to a market that is stabilizing somewhat in aggregate but becoming more selective and more geopolitical in where material goes. Overseas shipments totaled 5,238 metric tons in March, down 1.6% from a year earlier but up 10.5% from February.

In the first quarter, exports rose 4.8% year on year to 16,001 tons. Germany, South Korea, Vietnam, the United States, and India were the top five destinations in March, but shipments to the US fell for a fifth straight month, dropping 9.5% from February to 406 tons, a nine-month low and 30.6% below the level of a year earlier.

China’s March clean-tech export data suggest that the global energy shock is beginning to translate into stronger overseas demand for the products that reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels. Customs data showed March exports of lithium-ion batteries rose 34% year on year, electric-vehicle exports rose 53%, and solar-cell exports jumped 80%. All three categories also increased from February levels.

The background to this is that China was already moving into 2026 with a powerful clean-tech export machine. Earlier first-quarter data showed lithium battery exports up about 50% year on year, an acceleration from 26% growth across full-year 2025, while other green-tech categories were also strengthening. That means March did not come out of nowhere. The war appears to be amplifying a trend that was already in place rather than creating it from scratch.

The Iran war is highlighting a long-standing structural difference between Europe’s oil majors and their US peers: the Europeans built large, opportunistic trading houses inside their energy companies, while the Americans generally kept trading closer to a network-optimization function. In a crisis defined by violent price swings, dislocated regional spreads, and disrupted shipping routes, that distinction matters enormously.

The result is that BP, Shell, and TotalEnergies are seeing their trading arms deliver an outsized earnings boost just as the war is also hurting some of their physical production, whereas Exxon and Chevron are flagging large first-quarter hits tied to derivatives timing and disrupted deliveries.

The Iran war is now tightening copper and nickel supply through a channel that sits one step removed from the metals themselves: sulfur. What began as an aluminium crisis is broadening into a more systemic industrial problem because the Gulf’s oil and gas sector is a major source of sulfur, and that sulfur is essential for producing sulfuric acid, which in turn is a critical reagent for both copper leaching and nickel processing.

With Hormuz disruption trapping much of that Gulf sulfur and governments prioritizing fertilizer over metals, the war is pushing another strategic input into shortage and raising the risk of production cuts far beyond the energy sector.

The European Union is preparing to tell member states that Europe can no longer treat Middle Eastern jet fuel as a dependable pillar of its aviation system. Draft guidance expected next week will push countries to diversify away from Gulf supply, examine greater use of US imports, and place more emphasis on longer-term resilience through sustainable aviation fuel and synthetic fuels.

The Commission is also preparing practical recommendations on how to manage possible shortages, even while stopping short of changing the EU’s emissions trading or SAF rules in response to airline lobbying.

The rerouting of fertilizer out of the United States shows how distorted the nitrogen market has become. Instead of imported urea moving inland to US farmers during spring planting, some barges bought at the Port of New Orleans are being reloaded for export because prices overseas are so much higher. The price gap is large enough (around $170 per short ton) that traders can profit by pulling supply away from the US market and sending it to better-paying destinations.

The background is the same shock now running through much of the global commodity system: the Iran war has disrupted a key chokepoint and pushed up prices well beyond the directly affected region. More than 30% of global nitrogen fertilizer exports are linked to flows disrupted by the crisis, and fertilizer prices had already begun rising sharply in March when analysts warned that the conflict could not have come at a worse time for spring planting.

The Netherlands is moving into the first phase of its energy crisis plan, which signals market distortion rather than immediate physical shortage. Under that stage, the government and industry will intensify monitoring and contingency planning while preparing for possible escalation if fuel-market conditions worsen. It is the first time The Hague has activated this framework since it was designed during the 2022 energy shock.

What matters is that this is a precautionary move, not a declaration of imminent shortage. The Dutch government says the EU currently has enough jet-fuel reserves and domestic production capacity for about five months, while diesel and petrol coverage is estimated to last more than a year thanks to strategic reserves and current output.