Copper’s pullback from a record close does not undermine the larger bullish story, but it does show that the rally is now high enough to create demand resistance in China. LME copper fell as much as 1.9% on Thursday, ending an eight-day advance that had taken prices close to historic highs.

The metal was trading around $14,054.50 a ton, while Shanghai copper closed 1.6% lower at 106,750 yuan a ton. The retreat came as Chinese buyers began delaying purchases after the rally pushed domestic prices above levels many fabricators consider difficult to absorb. 

Japan’s decision to loosen its arms-export restrictions is a major strategic opening for its defense industry, but it is not an instant transformation into a global weapons powerhouse. The policy change matters because it removes one of the biggest self-imposed constraints on Japanese defense companies at exactly the moment global demand for weapons is rising sharply.

Global military expenditure reached a record $2.887 trillion in 2025, the 11th consecutive annual increase, with especially strong growth in Europe and Asia-Oceania. That is the market Japan is now trying to enter more seriously. The timing is favorable. Wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, rising tension around Taiwan, North Korea’s missile advances and uncertainty about U.S. commitments have all pushed governments to buy more air-defense systems, naval platforms, artillery, missiles, drones and armored vehicles.

Macron’s Nairobi summit was an attempt to recast France’s Africa policy around investment, infrastructure and strategic partnership at a time when Paris’ older security-centered model has lost much of its authority. The symbolism was deliberate. By co-hosting the Africa Forward Summit with Kenya’s William Ruto, far from France’s former colonial sphere in West Africa, Macron was signaling that France wants a broader, less militarized relationship with the continent.

More than 30 African leaders attended, and that Macron announced a large package of French-backed investment alongside a proposal for a first-loss guarantee mechanism to draw private capital into African infrastructure. The headline numbers are significant, though they should be read carefully. Reports put the total summit commitments at around $27 billion, including roughly €14 billion from French public and private sources and additional African commitments.

Europe’s gas industry is pressing Brussels to loosen the bloc’s storage rules because the market is already warning that rigid refill targets could make this summer’s gas-buying season more expensive than necessary. Eurogas and the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers are urging the European Commission and member states to activate existing flexibility early, rather than wait until buyers are forced to compete aggressively for LNG later in the season.

The industry groups want flexibility used at the start of the refill period to reduce pressure on prices. The Commission has already urged governments to refill gradually and use the flexibility available in EU law because storage is unusually low and the Iran war has tightened global LNG supply.

From the perspective of the crude oil market, the ideal outcome of the Trump-Xi summit would not be a large aircraft order, a soybean pledge, or another temporary trade-management mechanism. It would be a credible diplomatic path that reopens the Strait of Hormuz and allows both Washington and Tehran to claim enough political victory to step back. That would do more to stabilize oil than almost anything else the two leaders could announce in Beijing.

The reason is simple: the oil market’s problem is no longer mainly sentiment. It is physical supply. The Iran war and the effective closure of Hormuz have removed a massive volume of crude and refined products from normal trade, while also disrupting LNG and industrial inputs. Oil prices edged around the Trump-Xi meeting because markets see the summit as a possible turning point, but analysts remain skeptical about whether China is willing or able to push Tehran hard enough to reopen the chokepoint.

India is facing one of the clearest emerging-market macro shocks from the Iran war because the crisis is hitting both sides of its external account at once. The country imports around 90% of its oil and about half of its gas, so the sustained rise in global energy prices is making imports more expensive, widening the current-account deficit and putting direct pressure on the rupee.

The currency hit another record low on Thursday at 95.9575 per dollar, its third consecutive day of record lows, making it Asia’s worst-performing currency so far in 2026. The problem is that the shock is not limited to the current account. India is also facing heavy pressure on the capital account, with foreign investors pulling more than $20 billion from Indian equities since the war began.

Indonesia’s nickel policy is entering a more confrontational phase, and Chinese investors are warning that Jakarta may be endangering the very investment boom that made the country the world’s dominant nickel supplier. China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia sent a letter to President Prabowo Subianto complaining about tighter ore quotas, higher taxes, a revised benchmark pricing formula, stricter enforcement, visa limits, project suspensions and alleged corruption and extortion by officials.

The sharpest warning focused on nickel, where Chinese companies dominate downstream processing after years of investment in smelters, stainless steel plants and battery-material facilities. The dispute reflects a structural tension at the center of Indonesia’s resource strategy. Jakarta wants to capture more value from its mineral wealth rather than remain a raw-material supplier.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is beginning to expose how deeply the semiconductor industry depends on energy and chemical flows that sit far upstream from the chip fabs themselves. The immediate concern is fuel. Taiwan and South Korea, home to TSMC, Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, are among the world’s most important semiconductor producers, but both rely heavily on imported energy.

Taiwan is especially exposed: It had relied on Qatar for about one-third of its LNG before the conflict and has had to secure alternative supplies from countries including Australia and the United States. LNG is particularly difficult because it cannot be stockpiled as easily as coal or oil, and Taiwan uses it as a major source of electricity for an economy whose most valuable industry is also one of its most power-hungry.